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Abstract
In this paper, we study an intelligent reflecting surface (IRS)-aided wireless secure
communication system for physical layer security, where an IRS is deployed to adjust
its reflecting elements to secure the communication of multiple legitimate users in the
presence of multiple eavesdroppers. Aiming to improve the system secrecy rate, a de-
sign problem for jointly optimizing the base station (BS)’s beamforming and the IRS’s
reflecting beamforming is formulated considering different quality of service (QoS)
requirements and time-varying channel conditions. As the system is highly dynamic
and complex, and it is challenging to address the non-convex optimization problem, a
novel deep reinforcement learning (DRL)-based secure beamforming approach is firstly
proposed to achieve the optimal beamforming policy against eavesdroppers in dynamic
environments. Furthermore, post-decision state (PDS) and prioritized experience replay
(PER) schemes are utilized to enhance the learning efficiency and secrecy performance.
Specifically, PDS is capable of tracing the environment dynamic characteristics and
adjust the beamforming policy accordingly. Simulation results demonstrate that the
proposed deep PDS-PER learning based secure beamforming approach can significantly
improve the system secrecy rate and QoS satisfaction probability in IRS-aided secure
communication systems.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Physical layer security (PLS) has attracted increasing attention as an alternative of cryptography-
based techniques for wireless communications [1], where PLS exploits the wireless channel
characteristics by using signal processing designs and channel coding to support secure commu-
nication services without relying on a shared secret key [1], [2]. So far, a variety of approaches
have been reported to improve PLS in wireless communication systems, e.g., cooperative relaying
strategies [3], [4], artificial noise-assisted beamforming [5], [6], and cooperative jamming [7],
[8]. However, employing a large number of active antennas and relays in PLS systems incurs
an excessive hardware cost and the system complexity. Moreover, cooperative jamming and
transmitting artificial noise require extra transmit power for security guarantees.
To tackle these shortcomings of the existing approaches [3]-[8], a new paradigm, called
intelligent reflecting surface (IRS) [9]-[13], has been proposed as a promising technique to
achieve high spectrum efficiency and energy efficiency, and enhance secrecy rate in the fifth
generation (5G) and beyond wireless communication systems. In particular, IRS is a uniform
planar array which is comprised of a number of low-cost passive reflecting elements, where
each of elements adaptively adjusts its reflection amplitude and/or phase to control the strength
and direction of the electromagnetic wave, hence IRS is capable of enhancing and/or weakening
the reflected signals at different users [9]. As a result, the reflected signal by IRS can increase
the received signal at legitimate users while suppressing the signal at the eavesdroppers [9]-
[13]. Hence, from the PLS perspective, some innovative studies have been recently devoted to
performance optimization for IRS-aided secure communications [14]-[25].
A. Related Works
Initial studies on IRS-aided secure communication systems have reported in [14]-[17], where
a simple system model with only a single-antenna legitimate user and a single-antenna eaves-
dropper was considered in these works. The authors in [14] and [15] applied the alternative
optimization (AO) algorithm to jointly optimize the transmit beamforming vector at the base
station (BS) and the phase elements at the IRS for the maximization of the secrecy rate, but
they did not extend their models to multi-user IRS-assisted secure communication systems. To
minimize the transmit power at the BS subject to the secrecy rate constraint, the authors in [18]
3utilized AO solution and semidefinite programming (SDP) relaxation to address the optimization
problem with the objective to jointly optimize the power allocation and the IRS reflecting
beamforming. In addition, Feng, et al. [19] also studied the secure transmission framework
with an IRS to minimize the system transmit power in cases of rank-one and full-rank BS-
IRS links, and derived a closed-form expression of beamforming matrix. Different from these
studies [14]-[19] which considered only a single eavesdropper, secure communication systems
comprising multiple eavesdroppers were investigated in [20]-[22]. Chen, et al. [20] presented
a minimum-secrecy-rate maximization design to provide secure communication services for
multiple legitimate users while keeping them secret from multiple eavesdroppers in an IRS-aided
multi-user multiple-input single-output (MISO) system, but the simplification of the optimization
problem may cause a performance loss. The authors in [23] and [24] studied an IRS-aided
multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) channel, where a multi-antenna BS trasnmits data stream
to a multi-antenna legitimate user in the presence of an eavesdropper configured with multiple
antennas, and a suboptimal secrecy rate maximization approach was presented to optimize
the beamforming policy. In addition to the use of AO or SDP in the system performance
optimization, the minorization-maximization (MM) algorithm was recently utilized to optimize
the joint transmit beamforming at the BS and phase shift coefficient at the IRS [16], [23].
Moreover, the authors in [22] and [25] employed the artificial noise-aided beamforming for
IRS-aided MISO secure communication systems to improve the system secrecy rate, and an AO
based solution was applied to jointly optimize the BSs beamforming, artificial noise interference
vector and IRSs reflecting beamforming with the goal to maximize the secrecy rate. All these
existing studies [14]-[20], [22]-[25] assumed that perfect channel state information (CSI) of
legitimate users or eavesdroppers is available at the BS, which is not a practical assumption.
The reason is that acquiring perfect CSI at the BS is challenging since the corresponding CSI
may be outdated when the channel is time-varying due to the transmission delay, processing
delay, and high mobility of users. Hence, Yu, et al. [21] investigated a optimization problem
with considering the effectt of outdated CSI of the eavesdropping channels in an IRS-aided
secure communication system, and a robust algorithm was proposed to address the optimization
problem in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers.
The above mentioned studies [14]-[25] mainly applied the traditional optimization techniques
4e.g., AO, SDP or MM algorithms to jointly optimize the BSs beamforming and the IRSs reflecting
beamforming in IRS-aided secure communication systems, which are less efficient for large-
scale systems. Inspired by the recent advances of artificial intelligence (AI), several works
attempted to utilize AI algorithms to optimize IRSs reflecting beamforming [26]-[29]. Deep
learning (DL) was exploited to search the optimal IRS reflection matrices that maximize the
achievable system rate in an IRS-aided communication system, and the simulation demonstrated
that DL significantly outperforms conventional algorithms. Moreover, the authors in [31] and
[32] proposed deep reinforcement learning (DRL) based approach to address the non-convex
optimization problem, and the phase shifts at the IRS are optimized effectively. However, the
works [26]-[29] merely considered to maximize the system achievable rate of a single user
without considering the scenario of multiple users, secure communication and imperfect CSI
in their models. The authors in [30] and [31] applied reinforcement learning (RL) to achieve
smart beamforming at the BS against an eavesdropper in complex environments, but the IRS-
aided secure communication system needs to optimize the IRS’s reflect beamforming in addition
to the BS’s transmit beamforming. To the best of our knowledge, RL or DRL has not been
explored yet in prior works to optimize both the BS’s transmit beamforming and the IRS’s
reflect beamforming in dynamic IRS-aided secure communication systems, under the condition
of multiple eavesdroppers and imperfect CSI, which thus motivates this work.
B. Contributions
In this paper, we investigate an IRS-aided secure communication system with the objective
to maximize the system secrecy rate of multiple legitimate users in the presence of multiple
eavesdroppers under realistic time-varying channels, while guaranteeing quality of service (QoS)
requirements of legitimate users. A novel DRL-based secure beamforming approach is firstly
proposed to jointly optimize the beamforming matrix at the BS and the reflecting beamforming
matrix (reflection phases) at the IRS in dynamic environments. The major contributions of this
paper are summarized as follows:
• The physical secure communication based on IRS with multiple eavesdroppers is investi-
gated under the condition of time-varying channel coefficients in this paper. In addition, we
formulate a joint BS’s transmit beamforming and IRS’s reflect beamforming optimization
5problem with the goal of maximizing the system secrecy rate while considering the QoS
requirements of legitimate users.
• An RL-based intelligent beamforming framework is presented to achieve the optimal BSs
beamforming and the IRS’s reflecting beamforming, where the central controller intelligently
optimizes the beamforming policy by using a Markov decision process (MDP) according to
the instantaneous observations from dynamic environment. Specifically, a QoS-aware reward
function is constructed by covering both the secrecy rate and users QoS requirements into
the learning process.
• A DRL-based secure beamforming approach is proposed to improve the learning efficiency
and secrecy performance by fully exploiting the information of complex structure of the
beamforming policy domain, where post-decision state (PDS) is utilized to improve the
learning efficiency and rate, and prioritized experience replay (PER) is applied to enhance
the sampling efficiency.
• Extensive simulation results are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
deep PDSPER leaning based secure beamforming approach in terms of improving the
secrecy rate and the QoS satisfaction probability, compared with other existing approaches.
For instance, the proposed learning approach achieves the secrecy rate and QoS satisfaction
level improvements of 17.21% and 8.67%, compared with the approach [14] in time-varying
channel condition.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the system model and
problem formulation. The optimization problem is formulated as an RL problem in Section III.
Section IV proposes a deep PDS-PER based secure beamforming approach. Section V provides
simulation results and Section VI concludes the paper.
Notations: In this paper, vectors and matrices are represented by Boldface lowercase and
uppercase letters, respectively. Tr(·), (·)∗ and (·)H denote the trace, the conjugate and the
conjugate transpose operations, respectively. | · | and || · || stand for the absolute value of a
scalar and the Euclidean norm of a vector or matrix, respectively. E[·] denotes the expectation
operation. CM×N represents the space of complex-valued matrices.
6Fig. 1. IRS-aided secure communication under multiple eavesdroppers.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. System Model
We consider an IRS-aided secure communication system, as shown in Fig. 1, where the BS
is equipped with N antennas to serve K single-antenna legitimate mobile users (MUs) in the
presence of M single-antenna eavesdroppers. An IRS with L reflecting elements is deployed
in the system to assist secure wireless communications from the BS to the MUs. The IRS is
equipped with a controller to coordinate the BS. For the ease of practical implementation, the
maximal reflection without power loss at the IRS is considered since the reflecting elements
are designed to maximize the reflected desired signal power to the MUs [13]-[23]. In addition,
unauthorized eavesdroppers aim to eavesdrop any of the data streams of the MUs. Hence, the
use of reflecting beamforming at IRS is also investigated to improve the achievable secrecy rate
at the MUs while suppressing the wiretapped data rate at the eavesdroppers.
Let K = {1, 2, . . . , K}, M = {1, 2, . . . ,M} and L = {1, 2, . . . , L} denote the MU set, the
eavesdropper set and the IRS reflecting element set, respectively. Let Hbr ∈ CL×N , hHbu,k ∈ C1×N ,
hHru,k ∈ C1×L, hHbe,m ∈ C1×N , and hHre,m ∈ C1×L denote the channel coefficients from the BS to
the IRS, from the BS to the k-th MU, from the IRS to the k-th MU, from the BS to the m-th
eavesdropper, and from the IRS to the m-th eavesdropper, respectively. All the above mentioned
channel coefficients in the system are assumed to be small-scale fading with path loss which
7follows the Rayleigh fading model [11]-[14], [21]. Let Ψ = diag(χ1ejθ1 , χ2ejθ2 , . . . , χLejθL)
denote the reflection coefficient matrix associated with effective phase shifts at the IRS, where
χl ∈ [0, 1] and θl ∈ [0, 2pi] denote the amplitude reflection factor and the phase shift coefficient
on the combined transmitted signal, respectively. As each phase shift is desired to be design to
achieve full reflection, we consider that χl = 1, ∀l ∈ L in the sequel of the paper. .
At the BS side, the beamforming vector for the k-th MU is denoted as vk ∈ CN×1, which is
the continuous linear precoding [11]-[16], [23]. Thus, the transmitted signal for all MUs at the
BS is written as x =
∑K
k=1 vksk, where sk is the transmitted symbol for the k-th MU which can
be modelled as independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables with zero mean
and unit variance [11]-[16], [23]. The total transmit power at the BS is subject to the maximum
power constraint:
E[||x||2] = Tr(VVH) ≤ Pmax (1)
where V ∆= [v1,v2, . . . ,vK ] ∈ CM×K , and Pmax is the maximum transmit power at the BS.
When the BS transmits a secret message to the k-th MU, the MU will receive the signal from
the BS and the reflected signal from the IRS. Accordingly, the received signal at MU k can be
given by
yk =
(
hHru,kΨHbr + h
H
bu,k
)
vksk︸ ︷︷ ︸
desired signal
+
∑
i∈K,i 6=k
(
hHru,kΨHbr + h
H
bu,k
)
visi︸ ︷︷ ︸
inter−userinterference
+nk
(2)
where nk denotes the additive complex Gaussian noise (AWGN) with the with zero mean and
variance δ2k at the k-th MU. In (2), we observe that in addition to the received desired signal,
each MU also suffers inter-user interference (IUI) in the system. In addition, the received signal
at eavesdropper m is expressed by
yk =
(
hHru,kΨHbr + h
H
bu,k
)
vksk︸ ︷︷ ︸
desired signal
+
∑
i∈K,i 6=k
(
hHru,kΨHbr + h
H
bu,k
)
visi︸ ︷︷ ︸
inter−userinterference
+nk
(3)
where nk is the AWGN of eavesdropper m with the variance δ2m .
8Based on (2), the data rate of the k-th MU in (bits/s/Hz) is given by
Ruk = log2
1 +
∣∣(hHru,kΨHbr + hHbu,k)vk∣∣2∣∣∣∣∣ ∑i∈K,i 6=k (hHru,kΨHbr + hHbu,k)vi
∣∣∣∣∣
2
+ δ2k
 . (4)
If the m-th eavesdropper attempts to eavesdrop the signal of the k-th MU, its achievable
wiretapped data rate can be expressed by
Rem,k = log2
1 +
∣∣(hHre,mΨHbr + hHbe,m)vk∣∣2∣∣∣∣∣ ∑i∈K,i 6=k (hHre,mΨHbr + hHbe,m)vi
∣∣∣∣∣
2
+ δ2m
 . (5)
Since each eavesdropper can eavesdrop any of the K MUs’ signal, according to [14]-[25], the
achievable individual minimum-secrecy rate from the BS to the k-th MU can be expressed by
Rseck =
[
Ruk −max∀m R
e
m,k
]+
(6)
where [z]+ = max(0, z).
In practical systems, it is not easy for the BS and the IRS to obtain perfect CSI [9], [21].
This is due to the fact that both the transmission delay and processing delay exist, as well as
the mobility of the users. Therefore, CSI may be outdated at the time when the BS and the IRS
transmits the data stream to the MUs [21]. Once this outdated CSI is employed for beamforming,
it will lead to a negative effect on the demodulation at the MUs, thereby leading to substantial
performance loss [21]. Therefore, it is necessary to consider outdated CSI in the IRS-aided
secure communication system.
Let Tdelay denote the delay between the outdated CSI and the real-time CSI. In other words,
when the BS receives the pilot sequences sent from the MUs at the time slot t, it will complete
the channel estimation process and begin to transmit data stream to the MUs at the time slot
t+Tdelay. Hence, the relation between the outdated channel vector h(t) and the real-time channel
9vector h(t+ Tdelay) can be expressed by
h(t+ Tdelay) = ρh(t) +
√
1− ρ2hˆ(t+ Tdelay). (7)
In (7), hˆ(t+ Tdelay) is independent identically distributed with h(t) and h(t+ Tdelay), and it
is with zero-mean and unit-variance complex Gaussian entries. ρ is the autocorrelation function
(outdated CSI coefficient) of the channel gain h(t) and 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, which is given by
ρ = J0(2pipifDTdelay) (8)
where J0(·) is the zeroth-order Bessel function of the first kind, fD is the Doppler spread which
is generally a function of the velocity (υ) of the transceivers, the carrier frequency (fc) and
the speed of light (c), i.e., fD = υfc/c. Note that ρ = 1 indicates the outdated CSI effect is
eliminated, whereas ρ = 0 represents no CSI.
B. Problem Formulation
To improve the security of the above mentioned IRS-aided communication system in the
physical layer, we need to jointly optimize the BS’s transmit beamforming matrix V and the
IRS’ reflecting beamforming matrix Ψ to maximize the achievable secrecy rate among all the
MUs, subject to the QoS requirements and total transmit power constraint in the system. As
such, the optimization problem is formulated as
max
V,Ψ
∑
k∈K
Rseck
s.t. (a) : Rseck ≥ Rsec ,mink ,∀k ∈ K,
(b) : Ruk ≥ Rmink , ∀k ∈ K,
(c) : Tr(V) ≤ Pmax,
(d) : |χlejθl | = 1, 0 ≤ θl ≤ 2pi, ∀l ∈ L
(9)
where Rsec ,mink is the target secrecy rate of the k-th MU, and R
min
k denotes its target data
rate. The constraints in (9a) and (9b) are imposed to satisfy the secure communication and
the minimum data rate requirements, respectively. The constraint in (9c) is set to satisfy the
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BS’s maximum power constraint. The constraint in (9d) is the constraint of the IRS reflecting
elements. Obviously, it is challenging to obtain an optimal solution to the optimization (9), since
the objective function in (9) is non-concave with respect to either V or Ψ, and the coupling of
the optimization variables (V and Ψ) and the unit-norm constraints in (9d) are non-convex.
III. PROBLEM TRANSFORMATION BASED ON RL
The optimization problem given in (9) is difficult to address as it is a non-convex problem.
In addition, in realistic IRS-aided secure communication systems, the capabilities of MUs, the
channel quality, and the service applications will change dynamically. Moreover, the problem in
(9) is just a single time slot optimization problem, which may converge to a suboptimal solution
and obtain the greedy-search like performance due to the ignorance of the historical system state
and the long term benefit. Hence, it is generally infeasible to apply the traditional optimization
techniques (AO, SDP, and MM) to achieve an effective secure beamforming policy in uncertain
dynamic environments.
Model-free RL is a dynamic programming tool which can be adopted to solve the decision-
making problem by learning the optimal solution in dynamic environments [32]. Hence, we
model the secure beamforming optimization problem as an RL problem. In RL, the IRS-aided
secure communication system is treated as an environment, the central controller at the BS is
regarded as a learning agent. The key elements of RL are defined as follows
State space: Let S denote the system state space. The current system state s ∈ S includes
the channel information of all users, the predicted secrecy rate, the transmission data rate of the
last time slot and the QoS satisfaction level, which is defined as
s =
{{hk}k∈K , {hm}m∈M, {Rseck }k∈K, {Rk}k∈K, {QoSk}k∈K} (10)
where hk and hm are the channel coefficients of the k-th MU and m-th eavesdropper, respectively.
QoSk is the feedback QoS satisfaction level of the k-th MU. Other parameters in (10) are already
defined in Section II.
Action space: Let A denote the system action space. According to the observed system state s,
the central controller chooses the beamforming vector {vk}k∈K at the BS and the IRS reflecting
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beamforming coefficient (phase shift) {θl}l∈L at the IRS. Hence, the action a ∈ A can be defined
by
a =
{{vk}k∈K, {θl}l∈L} . (11)
Transition probability: Let T (s′|s, a) represent the transition probability, which is the prob-
ability of transitioning to a new state s′ ∈ S, given the action a executed in the sate s.
Reward function: In RL, the reward acts as a signal to evaluate how good the secure beam-
forming policy is when the agent executes an action at a current state. The system performance
will be enhanced when the reward function at each learning step correlates with the desired
objective. Thus, it is important to design an efficient reward function to improve the MUs’ QoS
satisfaction levels.
In this paper, the reward function represents the optimization objective, and our objective is to
maximize the system secrecy rate of all MUs while guaranteeing their QoS requirements. Thus,
the presented QoS-aware reward function is expressed as
r =
∑
k∈K
Rseck︸ ︷︷ ︸
part 1
−
∑
k∈K
µ1p
sec
k︸ ︷︷ ︸
part 2
−
∑
k∈K
µ2p
u
k︸ ︷︷ ︸
part 3
(12)
where
pseck =
 1, if Rseck < R
sec ,min
k ,∀k ∈ K,
0, otherwise,
(13)
puk =
 1, if Rk < Rmink ,∀k ∈ K,0, otherwise. (14)
In (12), the part 1 represents the immediate utility (system secrecy rate), the part 2 and the
part 3 are the cost functions which are defined as the unsatisfied secrecy rate requirement and the
unsatisfied minimum rate requirement, respectively. The coefficients µ1 and µ2 are the positive
constants of the part 2 and the part 3 in (12) , respectively, and they are used to balance the
12
utility and cost [33]-[35].
The goals of (13) and (14) are to impose the QoS satisfaction levels of both the secrecy rate
and the minimum data rate requirements, respectively. If the QoS requirement is satisfied in the
current time slot, then pseck = 0 or p
u
k = 0, indicating that there is no punishment of the reward
function due to the successful QoS guarantees.
The goal of the learning agent is to search for an optimal policy pi∗ (pi is a mapping from
states in S to the probabilities of choosing an action in A: pi(s) : S → A) that maximizes the
long-term expected discounted reward, and the cumulative discounted reward function can be
defined as
Ut =
∞∑
τ=0
γτrt+τ+1 (15)
where γ ∈ (0, 1] denotes the discount factor. Under a certain policy pi, the state-action function
of the agent with a state-action pair (s, a) is given by
Qpi(st, at) = Epi [Ut|st = s, at = a] . (16)
The conventional Q-Learning algorithm can be adopted to learn the optimal policy. The key
objective of Q-Learning is to update Q-table by using the Bellman’s equation as follows:
Qpi(st, at) = Epi
rt + γ ∑
st+1∈S
T (st+1|st, at)
∑
at+1∈A
pi(st+1, at+1)Q
pi(st+1, at+1)
 . (17)
The optimal action-value function in (17) is equivalent to the Bellman optimality equation,
which is expressed by
Q∗(st, at) = rt + γmax
at+1
Q∗(st+1, at+1) (18)
and the state-value function is achieved as follows:
V (st) = max
at∈A
Q(st, at). (19)
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In addition, the Q-value is updated as follows:
Qt+1(st, at) = (1− αt)Qt(st, at) + αt (rt + γVt(st+1)) (20)
where αt ∈ (0, 1] is the learning rate. Q-Learning generally constructs a lookup Q-table Q(s, a)
, and the agent selects actions based on the greedy policy for each learning step [32]. In the
ε−greedy policy, the agent chooses the action with the maximum Q-table value with probability
1 − ε, whereas a random action is picked with probability ε to avoid achieving stuck at non-
optimal policies [32]. Once the optimal Q-function Q∗(s, a) is achieved, the optimal policy is
determined by
pi∗(s, a) = argmax
a∈A
Q∗(s, a). (21)
IV. DEEP PDS-PER LEARNING BASED SECURE BEAMFORMING
The secure beamforming policy discussed in Section III can be numerically achieved by using
Q-Learning, policy gradient, and deep Q-Network (DQN) algorithms [32]. However, Q-Learning
is not an efficient learning algorithm because it cannot deal with continuous state space and it
has slow learning convergence speed. The policy gradient algorithm has the ability to handle
continuous state-action spaces, but it may converge to a suboptimal solution. In addition, it is
intractable for Q-learning and policy gradient algorithms to solve the optimization problem under
high-dimensional input state space. Although DQN performs well in policy learning problem
with continuous and high-dimensional state space, its non-linear Q-function estimator may lead
to unstable or even diverge.
Considering the fact that the IRS-aided secure communication system has high-dimensional
and high-dynamical characteristics according to the system state that is defined in (10) and uncer-
tain CSI that is shown in (7), we propose a deep PDS-PER learning based secure beamforming
approach, as shown in Fig. 2, where PDS-learning and PER mechanisms are utilized to enable
the learning agent to learn and adapt faster in dynamic environments. In detail, the agent utilizes
the observed state (i.e, CSI, previous secrecy rate, QoS satisfaction level), the feedback reward
from environment as well as the historical experience from the replay buffer to train its learning
14
Fig. 2. Deep PDS-PER learning based beamforming for IRS-aided secure communications.
model. After that, the agent employs the trained model to make decision (beamforming matrices
V and Ψ) based on its learned policy. The procedures of the proposed learning based secure
beamforming are provided in the following subsections.
Note that the policy optimization (in terms of the BS’s beamforming matrix V and the
RIS’s reflecting beamforming matrix Ψ) in the IRS-aided secure communication system can
be performed at the BS and that the optimized reflecting beamforming matrix can be transferred
in an offline manner to the IRS by the controller to adjust the corresponding reflecting elements
accordingly.
A. Proposed Deep PDS-PER Learning
As discussed in Section II, CSI is unlikely to be known accurately due to the transmission
delay, processing delay, and mobility of users. At the same time, beamforming with outdated CSI
will decrease the secrecy capacity, and therefore, a fast optimization solution needs to be designed
to reduce processing delay. PDS-learning as a well-known algorithm has been used to improve
the learning speed by exploiting extra partial information (e.g., the previous location information
and the mobility velocity of MUs or eavesdroppers that affect the channel coefficients)) and
search for an optimal policy in dynamic environments [33]-[35]. Motivated by this, we devise
a modified deep PDS-learning to trace the environment dynamic characteristics, and then adjust
15
the transmit beamforming at the BS and the reflecting elements at the IRS accordingly, which
can speed up the learning efficiency in dynamic environments.
PDS-learning can be defined as an immediate system state s˜t ∈ S happens after executing
an action at at the current state st and before the next time state st+1 . In detail, the PDS-
learning agent takes an action at at state st, and then will receive known reward rk(st, at)
from the environment before transitioning the current state st to the PDS state s˜t with a known
transition probability T k(s˜t|st, at). After that, the PDS state further transform to the next state
st+1 with an unknown transition probability T u(st+1|s˜t, at) and an unknown reward ru(st, at),
where corresponds to the wireless CSI dynamics. In PDS-learning, st+1 is independent of st given
the PDS state s˜t, and the reward r(st, at) is decomposed into the sum of rk(st, at) and ru(st, at)
at s˜t and st+1, respectively. Mathematically, the state transition probability in PDS-learning from
st to st+1 admits
T (st+1|st, at) =
∑
s˜t
T u(st+1|s˜t, at)T k(s˜t|st, at). (22)
Moreover, it can be verified that the reward of the current state-action pair (st, at) is expressed
by
r(st, at) = r
k(st, at) +
∑
s˜t
T k(s˜t|st, at)ru(s˜t, at). (23)
At the time slot t, the PDS action-value function Q˜(s˜t, at) of the current PDS state-action
pair (s˜t, at) is defined as
Q˜(s˜t, at) = r
u(s˜t, at) + γ
∑
st+1
T u(st+1|s˜t, at)V (st+1). (24)
By employing the extra information (the known transition probability T k(s˜t|st, at) and known
reward rk(st, at)), the Q-function Qˆ(st, at) in PDS-learning can be further expanded under all
state-action pairs (s, a), which is expressed by
Qˆ(st, at) = r
k(st, at) +
∑
s˜t
T k(s˜t|st, at)Q˜(s˜t, at). (25)
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The state-value function in PDS-learning is defined by
Vˆt(st) =
∑
st+1
T k(st+1|st, at)V˜ (st+1) (26)
where V˜t(st+1) = max
at∈A
Q˜t(s˜t+1, at). At each time slot, the PDS action-value function Q˜(s˜t, at)
is updated by
Q˜t+1(s˜t, at) = (1− αt)Q˜t(s˜t, at) + αt
(
ru(s˜t, at) + γVˆt(st+1)
)
. (27)
After updating Q˜t+1(s˜t, at), the action-value function Qˆt+1(st, at) can be updated by plugging
Q˜t+1(s˜t, at) into (25).
After presenting in the above modified PDS-learning, a deep PDS learning algorithm is
presented. In the presented learning algorithm, the traditional DQN is adopted to estimatete
the action-value Q-function Q(s, a) by using Q(s, a;θ), where θ denote the DNN parameter.
The objective of DQN is to minimize the following loss function at each time slot
L(θt) =
[
{Vˆt(st;θt)− Qˆ(st, at;θt)}2
]
=
[
{r(st, at) + γ max
at+1∈A
Qˆt(st+1, at+1;θt)− Qˆ(st, at;θt)}2
] (28)
where Vˆt(st;θt) = r(st, at) + γ max
at+1∈A
Qˆt(st+1, at+1;θt) is the target value. The error between
Vˆt(st;θt) and the estimated value Qˆ(st, at;θt) is usually called temporal-difference (TD) error,
which is expressed by
δt = Vˆt(st;θt)− Qˆ(st, at;θt). (29)
The DNN parameter θ is achieved by taking the partial differentiation of the objective function
(28) with respect to θ, which is given by
θt+1 = θt + β∇L(θt). (30)
where β is the learning rate of θ, and ∇(·) denotes the first-order partial derivative.
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Accordingly, the policy pˆit(s) of the modified deep PDS-learning algorithm is given by
pˆit(s) = argmax
at∈A
Qˆ(st, at;θt). (31)
Although DQN is capable of performing well in policy learning with continuous and high-
dimensional state space, DNN may learn ineffectively and cause divergence owing to the non-
stationary targets and correlations between samples. Experience replay is utilized to avoid the
divergence of the RL algorithm. However, classical DQN uniformly samples each transition
et = 〈st, at, rt, s˜t, st+1〉 from the experience replay, which may lead to an uncertain or negative
effect on learning a better policy. The reason is that different transitions (experience information)
in the replay buffer have different importance for the learning policy, and sampling every transi-
tion equally may unavoidably result in inefficient usage of meaningful transitions. Therefore, a
prioritized experience replay (PER) scheme has been presented to address this issue and enhance
the sampling efficiency [36], [37], where the priority of transition is determined by the values
of TD error. In PER, a transition with higher absolute TD error has higher priority in the sense
that is has more aggressive correction for the action-value function.
In the deep PDS-PER learning algorithm, similar to classical DQN, the agent collects and
stores each experience et = 〈st, at, rt, s˜t, st+1〉 into its experience replay buffer, and DNN updates
the parameter by sampling a mini-batch of tuples from the replay buffer. So far, PER was adopted
only for DRL and Q-learning, and has never been employed with the PDS-learning algorithm
to learn the dynamic information. In this paper, we further extend this PER scheme to enable
prioritized experience replay in the proposed deep PDS-PER learning framework, in order to
improve the learning convergence rate.
The probability of sampling transition i (experience i) based on the absolute TD-error is
defined by
p(i) = |δ(i)|η1
/∑
j′
|δ(j′)|η1 (32)
where the exponent η1 weights how much prioritization is used, with η1 = 0 corresponding to
being uniform sampling. The transition with higher p(i) will be more likely to be replayed from
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the replay buffer, which is associated with very successful attempts by preventing the DNN from
being over-fitting. With the help of PER, the proposed deep PDS-PER learning algorithm tends
to replay valuable experience and hence learns more effectively to find the best policy.
It is worth noting that experiences with high absolute TD-error are more frequently replayed,
which alters the visitation frequency of some experiences and hence causes the training process
of the DNN prone to diverge. To address this problem, importance-sampling (IS) weights are
adopted in the calculation of weight changes
W (i) = (D · p(i))−η2 (33)
where D is the size of the experience replay buffer, and the parameter η2 is used to adjust the
amount of correction used.
Accordingly, by using the PER scheme into the deep PDS-PER learning, the DNN loss function
(28) and parameter are rewritten respectively as follows:
L (θt) = 1
H
H∑
i=1
(WiLi(θt)) (34)
θt+1 = θt + βδt∇θL(θt)) (35)
Theorem 1: The presented deep PDS-PER learning can converge to the optimal Qˆ(st, at) of
the MDP with probability 1 when the learning rate sequence αt meets the following conditions
αt ∈ [0, 1),
∑∞
t=0 αt = ∞ and
∑∞
t=0 α
2
t < ∞, where the above mentioned requirements on
appear in most of the RL algorithms [32] and they are not specific to the proposed deep PDS-
PER learning algorithm [32].
Proof: If each action can be executed with an infinite number of learning steps at each system
state, or in other words, the learning policy is greedy with the infinite explorations, the Q-function
Qˆ(st, at) in PDS-learning and its corresponding policy strategy pi(s) will converge to the optimal
points, respectively, with the probability of 1 [33]-[35]. The existing references [34] and [35]
have provided the proof.
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B. Secure Beamforming Based on Proposed Deep PDS-PER Learning
Similar to most DRL algorithms, our proposed deep PDS-PER learning based secure beam-
forming approach consists of two stages, i.e., the training stage and implement stage. The training
process of the proposed approach is shown in Algorithm 1. A central controller at the BS is
responsible for collecting environment information and making decision for secure beamforming.
In the training stage, similar to RL-based policy control, the control controller initializes
network parameters and observes the current system state including CSI of all users, the previous
predicted secrecy rate and the transmission data rate. Then, the state vector is input into DQN
to train the learning model. The ε-greedy scheme is leveraged to balance both the exploration
and exploitation, i.e., the action with the maximum reward is selected probability 1- ε according
to the known knowledge, while a random action is chosen with probability ε based on the
unknown knowledge. After executing the selected action, the agent receives a reward from the
environment and observes the sate transition from st to PDS state s˜t and then to the next state
st+1. Then, PDS-learning is used to update the PDS action-value function Q˜(s˜t, at; θt) and Q-
function Qˆ(st, at; θt), before collecting and storing the transition tuple (also called experience)
et = 〈st, at, rt, s˜t, st+1〉 into the experience replay memory buffer D, which includes the current
system state, selected action, instantaneous reward and PDS state along with the next state. The
experience in the replay buffer is selected by the PER scheme to generate mini-batches and they
are used to train DQN. In detail, the priority of each transition p(i) is calculated by using (32)
and then get its IS weight W (i) in (33), where the priorities ensure that high-TD-value (δ(i))
transitions are replayed more frequently. The weight W (i) is integrated into deep PDS learning
to update both the loss function L(θ) and DNN parameter θ. Once DQN converges, the deep
PDS-PER learning model is achieved.
After adequate training in Algorithm 1, the learning model is loaded for the implement stage.
During the implement stage, the controller uses the trained learning model to output its selected
action a by going through the DNN parameter θ, with the observed state s from the IRS-aided
secure communication system. Specifically, it chooses an action a, with the maximum value
based on the trained deep PDS-PER learning model. Afterwards, the environment feeds back
an instantaneous reward and a new system state to the agent. Finally, the beamforming matrix
V∗ at the BS and the phase shift matrix Ψ∗ (reflecting beamforming) at the IRS are achieved
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according to the selected action.
We would like to point out that the training stage needs a powerful computation server which
can be performed offline at the BS while the implement stage can be completed online. The
trained learning model requires to be updated only when the environment (IRS-aided secure
communication system) has experienced greatly changes, mainly depending on the environment
dynamics and service requirements.
C. Computational Complexity Analysis
For the training stage, in DNN, let L, Z0 and Zl denote the training layers, the size of
the input layer (which is proportional to the number of states) and the number of neurons in
the l-th layer, respectively. The computational complexity in each time step for the agent is
O(Z0Zl +
∑L−1
l=1 ZlZl+1). In the training phase, each mini-batch has N
epi episodes with each
episode being T time steps, each trained model is completed over I iterations until convergence.
Hence, the total computational complexity in DNN is O
(
IN epiT (Z0Zl +
∑L−1
l=1 ZlZl+1)
)
. The
high computational complexity of the DNN training phase can be performed offline for a finite
number of episodes at a centralized powerful unit (such as the BS).
In our proposed deep PDS-PER learning algorithm, PDS-learning and PER schemes are
utilized to improve the learning efficiency and enhance the convergence speed, which requires
extra computational complexity. In PDS-learning leaning, since the set of PDS states is the
same as the set of MDP states S [30]-[32], the computational complexity of the classical DQN
algorithm and the deep PDS-learning algorithm are O(|S|2×|A|) and O(2|S|2×|A|), respectively.
In PER, since the relay buffer size is D, the system requires to make both updating and sampling
O (log2D) operations, so the computational complexity of the PER scheme is O (log2D).
According the above analysis, the complexity of the classical DQN algorithm and the proposed
deep PDS-PER learning algorithm are respectively O
(
IN epiT (Z0Zl +
∑L−1
l=1 ZlZl+1) + |S|2 × |A|
)
and O
(
IN epiT (Z0Zl +
∑L−1
l=1 ZlZl+1) + 2|S|2 × |A|+ log2D
)
, indicating that the complexity
of the proposed algorithm is slightly higher than the classical DQN learning algorithm. However,
our proposed algorithm achieves better performance than that of the classical DQN algorithm,
which will be shown in the next section.
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Algorithm 1 Deep PDS-PER Learning Based Secure Beamforming
1: Input: IRS-aided secure communication simulator and QoS requirements of all MUs (e.g.,
minimum secrecy rate and transmission rate).
2: Initialize: DQN with initial Q-function Q(s, a;θ), parameters θ, learning rate α and β.
3: Initialize: experience replay buffer D with size D, and mini-batch size H .
4: for each episode =1, 2, . . . , N epi do
5: Observe an initial system state s;
6: for each time step t=0, 1, 2, . . . , T do
7: Select action based on the ε-greedy policy at current state st: choose a random action at
with probability ε;
8: Otherwise, at = argmax
at∈A
Q(st, at; θt);
9: Execute action at, receive an immediate reward rk(st, at) and observe the sate transition
from st to PDS state s˜t and then to the next state st+1;
10: Update the reward function r(st, at) under PDS-learning using (23);
11: Update the PDS action-value function Q˜(s˜t, at;θt) using (27);
12: Update the Q-function Qˆ(st, at;θt) using (25);
13: Store PDS experience et = 〈st, at, rt, s˜t, st+1〉 in experience replay buffer D, if D is full,
remove least used experience from D;
14: for i= 1, 2, . . . , H do
15: Sample transition i with the probability p(i) using (32);
16: Calculate the absolute TD-error |δ(i)| in (29);
17: Update the corresponding IS weight Wi using (33);
18: Update the priority of transition i based on |δ(i)|;
19: end for
20: Update the loss function L (θ) and parameter θ of DQN using (34) and (35), respectively;
21: end for
22: end for
23: Output: Return the deep PDS-PER learning model.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
This section evaluates the performance of the IRS-aided secure communication system. As
illustrated in Fig. 3, K single-antenna MUs and M single-antenna eavesdroppers are randomly
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Fig. 3. Simulation setup.
located in the 100m × 100m half right-hand side rectangular of Fig. 3 (light blue area) in a
two-dimensional plane. The BS and the IRS are located at (0, 0) and (150, 100) in meter (m),
respectively. The background noise power of MUs and eavesdroppers is equal to -90 dBm.
We set the number of antennas at the BS is N = 4, the number of MUs is K = 2 and the
number of eavesdroppers is M = 2. The transmit power Pmax at the BS varies between 15
dBm and 40 dBm, the number of IRS elements L varies between 10 and 60, and the outdated
CSI coefficient ρ varies from 0.5 to 1 for different simulation settings. The minimum secrecy
rate and the minimum transmission data rate are 3 bits/s/Hz and 5 bits/s/Hz, respectively. The
path loss model is defined by PL = (PL0 − 10ς log 10(d/d0)) dB, where PL0 = 30 dB is the
path loss at the reference distance d0 = 1 m [9], ς = 3 is the path loss exponent, and d is the
distance from the transmitter to the receiver. The learning model consists of three connected
hidden layers, containing 500, 250, and 200 neurons [38], respectively. The learning rate is set
to α = 0.02, the discount factor is set to γ = 0.95 and the exploration rate is set to ε = 0.1. The
parameters µ1 and µ2 in (12) are set to µ1 = µ2 = 2 to balance the utility and cost [33]-[35].
Other parameters can be seen in references [9], [13] and [17]. The following simulation results
are averaged over 500 independent realizations.
In addition, simulation results are provided to evaluate the performance of the proposed deep
PDS-PER learning based secure beamforming approach (denoted as deep PDS-PER beamform-
ing) in the IRS-aided secure communication system, and compare the proposed approach with
the following exiting approaches:
• The classical DQN based secure beamforming approach (denoted as DQN-based beamform-
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Fig. 4. Convergence comparisons of various approaches.
ing), where DNN is employed to estimate the Q-value function, when acting and choosing
the secure beamforming policy corresponding to the highest Q-value.
• The existing secrecy rate maximization approach which optimizes the BS’s transmit beam-
forming and the IRS’s reflect beamforming by fixing other parameters as the constants
(denoted as Baseline 1 [14]).
• The optimal BS’s transmit beamforming approach without IRS assistance (denoted as op-
timal BS without IRS).
In Fig. 4, we first investigate the convergence performances of all secure beamforming ap-
proaches in terms of the average secrecy rate per MU, when Pmax = 30 dBm, L = 40, and
ρ = 0.95. It is observed that the secrecy rate of all approaches first enhances and then converges
to a constant level. In addition, it is worth noting that the proposed learning approach has the
faster convergence speed and higher secrecy rate than that of the DQN approach by adopting
by PDS-learning and PER schemes to enhance the learning efficiency, in order to improve
convergence speed and provide the global optimal solution for joint beamforming optimization
problem. Even through the Baseline1 approach needs the smaller number of iterations to achieve
convergence than that of the DQN approach, it has lower secrecy rate. Moreover, the optimal
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Fig. 5. Performance comparisons versus the maximum transmit power at the BS.
BS beamforming approach without IRS has the fastest convergent speed, but its performance is
worst among the four approaches, because it does not employ the IRS for security provisioning.
Fig. 5 shows the average secrecy rate and QoS satisfaction level versus the maximum trans-
mit power Pmax, when L = 40 and ρ = 0.95. As expected, both the secrecy rate and QoS
satisfaction level of all the approaches enhance monotonically with increasing Pmax. The reason
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is that when Pmax increases, the received SINR at MUs improves, leading to the performance
improvement. In addition, we find that our proposed learning approach outperforms the Baseline1
approach. In fact, our approach jointly optimizes the beamforming matrixes V and Ψ, which
can simultaneously facilitates more favorable channel propagation benefit for MUs and impair
eavesdroppers, while the Baseline1 approach optimizes the beamforming matrixes in an iterative
way. Moreover, our proposed approach has higher performance than DQN in terms of both
secrecy rate and QoS satisfaction level, due to its efficient learning capacity by utilizing PDS-
learning and PER schemes in the dynamic environment. From Fig. 5, we also find that the
three IRS assisted secure beamforming approaches provide significant higher secrecy rate and
QoS satisfaction level than the traditional system without IRS. This indicates that the IRS can
effectively guarantee secure communication and QoS requirements via reflecting beamforming,
where reflecting elements (IRS-induced phases) at the IRS can be adjusted to maximize the
received SINR at MUs and suppress the wiretapped rate at eavesdroppers.
In Fig. 6, the achievable secrecy rate and QoS satisfaction level performance of all approaches
are evaluated through changing the IRS elements, i.e., from L = 10 to 60, when Pmax = 30 dBm
and ρ = 0.95. For the secure beamforming approaches assisted by the IRS, their achievable
secrecy rates and QoS satisfaction levels are obvious increment with the number of the IRS
elements. The improvement results from the fact that more IRS elements, more signal paths
and signal power can be reflected by the IRS to improve the received SINR at the MUs but to
decrease the received SINR at the eavesdroppers. In addition, the performance of the approach
without IRS remains constant under the different numbers of the IRS elements.
From Fig. 6(a), it is found that the secrecy rate of the proposed learning approach is higher than
those of the Baseline 1 and DQN approaches, especially, their performance gap also obviously
increases with L, this is because that with more reflecting elements at the IRS, the proposed deep
PDS-PER learning based secure communication approach becomes more flexible for optimal
phase shift (reflecting beamforming) design and hence achieves higher gains. In addition, from
Fig. 6(b) compared with the Baseline 1 and DQN approaches, as the reflecting elements at the
IRS increases, we observe that the proposed learning approach is the first one who attains 100%
QoS satisfaction level. This superior achievements are based on the particular design of the
QoS-aware reward function shown in (12) for secure communication.
26
Fig. 6. Performance comparisons versus the number of IRS elements.
In Fig. 7, we further analyze how the system secrecy rate and QoS satisfaction level perfor-
mances are affected by the outdated CSI coefficient in the system, i.e., from ρ = 0.5 to 1, when
Pmax = 30 dBm and L = 40. Note that as decreases, the CSI becomes more outdated as shown
in (7) and (8), and ρ = 1 means non-outdated CSI. It can be observed from all beamforming
approaches, when CSI becomes more outdated (as ρ decreases), the average secrecy rate and
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Fig. 7. Performance comparisons versus outdated CSI coefficient ρ.
QoS satisfaction level decrease. The reason is that a higher value of ρ indicates more accurate
CSI, which will enable all the approaches to optimize secure beamforming policy to achieve
higher average secrecy rate and QoS satisfaction level in the system.
It can be observed that reducing ρ has more effects on the performance of the other three
approaches while our proposed learning approach still maintains the performance at a favor-
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able level, indicating that the other three approaches are more sensitive to the uncertainty of
CSI and the robust of the proposed learning approach. For instance, the proposed learning
approach achieves the secrecy rate and QoS satisfaction level improvements of 17.21% and
8.67%, compared with the Baseline 1 approach when ρ = 0.7. Moreover, in comparison, the
proposed learning approach has the best performance among all approaches. The reason is that
the proposed learning approach considers the time-varying channels and takes advantage of
PDS-learning to effectively learn the dynamic environment.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have investigated the joint BS’s beamforming and IRS’s reflect beamforming
optimization problem under the time-varying channel conditions. As the system is highly dynamic
and complex, we have exploited the recent advances of machine learning, and formulated the
secure beamforming optimization problem as an RL problem. A deep PDS-PER learning based
secure beamforming approach has been proposed to jointly optimize both the BS’s beamforming
and the IRS’s reflect beamforming in the dynamic IRS-aided secure communication system,
where PDS and PER schemes have been utilized to improve the learning convergence rate
and efficiency. Simulation results have verified that the proposed learning approach outperforms
other existing approaches in terms of enhancing the system secrecy rate and the QoS satisfaction
probability.
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